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This research examines whether analysts’ earnings forecasts incorporate information in price 
changes. Even if the forecasts do not explicitly depend upon price changes, there should 
nevertheless be a positive association between analysts’ forecast revisions and prior price 
changes. Moreover, if analysts incorporate only their private information in formulating a 
forecast and ignore price changes, then the likelihood that their estimate is less than (greater 
than) the realization increases following price increases (decreases). Empirical results are 
consistent with these conjectures and indicate that analysts’ forecasts do not fully reflect the 
information in prior price changes. 
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finding that the sign and magnitude of analyst forecast revisions are positively 
associated with the sign and magnitude of prior security price changes, e.g., 
Givoly and Lakonishok (1979) and Brown, Foster, and Noreen (1985) (BFN). 
In this regard BFN comment: 
‘An important but unresolved issue is the extent to which analysts use 
prior security returns as a basis for revising their earnings forecasts. It 
would be difficult to explain, from an economic survival perspective, the 
continued employment of analysts to forecast earnings if all they are 
doing is re-expressing, in earnings forecast format, the information 
already available in publicly observable datum such as security price.’ 
(p. 139) 
The extent to which analysts’ forecast revisions simply reflect the information 
in price changes that precede them bears directly on how they should be 
employed as a proxy for market expectations. 
In the analysis below, it is assumed that analysts acquire private signals 
about earnings. If price changes are also informative about earnings, then 
changes in analysts’ forecasts will be positively associated with prior price 
changes even if these forecasts do not explicitly incorporate the information 
conveyed in prior price changes.* Moreover, if analysts’ forecasts do not fully 
incorporate the information in prior price movements, then their forecast 
errors will be correlated with these price changes. This is true even if the 
independent signals acquired by analysts are more informative (precise) 
about earnings than price changes whose information content is excluded 
from analysts’ forecasts. 
Data from the Value Line Investment Survey are used to test whether 
information in prior price changes is fully reflected in analysts’ earnings 
forecast revisions. The evidence indicates that the sign of analysts’ forecast 
errors is not independent of the sign of prior price changes. 
Section 2 outlines the basic market setting. Section 3 formulates hypothe- 
ses that relate forecast revisions and errors to prior security returns. Section 
4 presents the empirical results. A summary and concluding remarks are 
found in section 5. 
*One explanation offered by BFN for the observed positive association between analysts’ 
revisions and prior security returns is that there is a delay in the public dissemination of analysts’ 
private information. The delay is of sufficient duration to make it appear as if analysts are 
mimicking price movements when, in fact, price is simply revealing the information analysts 
possessed prior to the price change. The case of a price change that only reflects analysts’ 
previously private information is indistinguishable from the case of analysts issuing forecasts that 
simply re-express the information in a prior price change. This case raises an issue of timing as 
well as informativeness that is also relevant to evaluating the appropriateness of analysts’ 
forecasts as earnings expectations. 
J.S. Abarbanell, Analysts’ earnings forecasts 149 
2. The model 
BFN hypothesize that the positive association between analysts’ forecast 
revisions and prior returns occurs because prices act as cues for analysts to 
acquire new information. The details of this explanation are not fully elabo- 
rated in their monograph. Abarbanell (1989) presents a model of a represen- 
tative uninformed investor faced with a portfolio choice between a risky 
investment and a risk-free investment. In that model, a market maker sets 
price equal to the expectation of the risky asset conditional on orders 
received by informed and uninformed traders. In this setting, price communi- 
cates information in a noisy fashion [see also, e.g., Glosten and Milgrom 
(1985) and Diamond and Verrecchia (198711. That is, price can be informa- 
tive about new earnings information without fully revealing the earnings even 
when they are known by some traders (insiders) with certainty. Price changes 
alter the uninformed trader’s beliefs about the earnings of the risky invest- 
ment and provide incentives to hire analysts to acquire new information 
before making an investment choice.3 
2.1. Price formation 
Consider a representative firm whose earnings can take on one of two 
values denoted w,, and w, which represent a ‘high’ or ‘low’ state, respec- 
tively.4 If the high (low) state is revealed, the firm’s value will be r,, (r,). The 
probability of the high (low) state occurring as assessed at time t, prior to the 
revelation of the earnings state is denoted prob(o,) (prob(w,)). The price of 
the firm at time t is assumed to be: 
P’=prob(o,)r,+prob(o,)r,. 
The following conditions are assumed: 
a prob(w,l P')/aP'> 0, (1) 
0 < prob(o,lP’) < 1, Vt. (2) 
‘Analysts in this model can be characterized as filters of noise in price. However, it is not 
necessary to assume that analysts are hired in response to price changes. The results presented 
later hold if analysts are hired prior to a price change but observe a price change before issuing a 
forecast. The relevant differences between these alternative constructions apply to the necessary 
conditions for hiring an analyst and the design of a compensation scheme to prevent the analyst 
from shirking and basing his forecast solely on the price change. 
4An alternative interpretation is that the two states represent an increase (decrease) in the 
expected (and currently priced) level of earnings. 
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The first condition ensures that price increases (decreases) are accompanied 
by an increase in the probability of the high (low) earnings state as assessed 
by the market. The strict inequality in the second condition ensures that the 
market cannot perfectly infer the earnings state from observing price prior to 
the earnings announcement. The conditions are consistent with a noisy 
rational expectations equilibrium in which prices are informative about the 
earnings state but are not fully revealing [see, e.g., Diamond and Verrecchia 
(1987)l. 
2.2. Analysts’ signals 
Analysts employ an information system that will generate one of two 
possible signals, y, and y,. The signal y, indicates that the state w,, is more 
likely to occur and the signal y, indicates that the state w, is more likely to 
occur.’ The conditional probability of receiving the signal yi when the state 
is wi is pij where p,, and phh are strictly between 0.5 and 1. It is assumed 
that the probabilities pij that represent the analyst’s information system are 
fixed and do not depend on price. The assumption implies that the signal 
produced by the analyst is not influenced by price changes. 
2.3. Properties of the analysts’ reports 
In a rational market, participants would be expected to recognize that 
prices convey information and condition their decisions accordingly. Indeed, 
this supposition is the basis for the null hypotheses tested in this paper. 
However, to simplify the discussion the propositions that follow are based on 
analysts’ forecasts that include only the analysts’ private signals. The poten- 
tial explanations for analysts’ forecasts to exclude price changes are discussed 
in later sections.6 
The first proposition demonstrates that even if information in prior price 
changes is omitted from analysts’ forecasts, investors will anticipate a positive 
association between forecast revisions and prior price changes. 
Proposition 1. The probability of receiving the report y, from a jixed informa- 
tion system is greater following a price increase than following a price decrease. 
The probability of receiving the report y, is greater following a price decrease 
than following a price increase. 
‘Under the alternative interpretation of the two earnings states yh and y, represent signals of 
an increase and decrease in expected earnings, respectively. 
?he proofs of the propositions rely on the notion that while an individual analyst’s forecast 
does not reflect price changes, the aggregate market (our representative investor) conditions on 
observed price changes when forming posteriors. 
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Proof. The probability of a high earnings report is 
prob( yh) = prob(w,lP’)p,, + (1 - prob(q,lP’))Phl. 
The effect of a price change on this probability is 
a prob( Y!,)/ap’ = ( Phh - ph,)a prob( w,J P’)pP’. 
By assumption, a prOb(w, IP’)/w > 0 and P,,,, > P/,1* Thus, 
8 prob( Y&apt > 0. 
Furthermore, because prob( yh) + prob( YJ = 1, a Prob( Y,)/ap’ < ‘. Q.E.D* 
Clearly, if analysts’ forecasts incorporate information in prices, price 
changes and forecast revisions will be positively associated. However, even if 
the analyst ignores prior price changes when issuing a forecast, the high 
earnings report is more likely to follow a price increase and a low earnings 
report is more likely to follow a price decrease. The simple intuition behind 
this association is that when changes in price and the analyst’s information 
system are both informative, the latter signal is more likely to ‘confirm’ rather 
than to contradict the former.’ 
However, the posterior probability of an accurate report by the analyst 
following a price change is only coincidentally the same for both earnings 
states when price change signals are omitted from forecasts. This point is 
summarized by Proposition 2. Define an inaccurate low earnings state report 
as (wh tY[) and an inaccurate high earnings state reported as (w,ly,). 
Proposition 2. The probability of an inaccurate low earnings signal from a 
fired information system (i.e., pii do not depend on price) increases and the 
probability of an inaccurate high earnings signal decreases as price increases. 
Proof. The probability of the high earnings state occurring following a low 
earnings signal is given by 
Prob( w/, IYr) 
= Prob( o/,7 Y,)/prob( Y,) 
= PrOb(w,IP’)P,,/{PrOb(o,IP’)P, + (1 - PrOb(%IP’))P,,). 
‘The analysis in Trueman (1988) leads to a similar prediction. Trueman explicitly models 
analysts’ incentives to revise their earnings forecasts. In his setting analysts may issue biased 
forecasts and withhold information. In this paper analysts report their private information fully 
and truthfully. 
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Similarly, the probability of the low earnings state occurring following a high 
earnings signal is given by 
prob( hd 
= prob( WI 9 Y,) /prob( Y,) 
= (1 - prob(CfJ,lP’))p,,/{(l - prob(a,lp,‘))&, + Prob(%l~‘)p& 
The changes in these respective probabilities with a change in price are given 
by 
aprob(oh(yt)/aPt = (aprOb(whI~')/a~')PthPtt/(Prob(yt))'~ 
By assumption, 8 prob(w,, IP’)/~P > 0. Thus, 
8 prOb( W,lJ’,)/aP’ > 0 and a prob( O,lY,)/ap’ < 0. Q.E.D. 
As the probability of the high earnings state increases, price increases. If 
the analyst uses a fixed information system and ignores price, then his 
forecast will tend to be too low subsequent to a price increase and too high 
subsequent to a price decrease. 
The intuition behind Proposition 2 carries over to the case in which 
analysts do not deliberately exclude the information in price changes in the 
formulation of their forecasts but sometimes fail to incorporate it. This 
phenomenon could, for example, be characterized by the exogenous imposi- 
tion of the probability, (Y, that analysts fail to observe a significant price 
change after it has taken place (where 0 I CY I 1). A value of CY greater than 0 
could be attributable to limitations of time and resources faced by analysts. 
Only when (Y = 0 are price movements fully accounted for in analysts’ 
forecasts. 
The analysis of this section describes the implication for forecast errors 
when analysts’ forecasts do not incorporate the information in prior price 
changes. The next section presents the results of empirical tests intended to 
determine if analysts’ forecasts do, in fact, account for price changes in their 
forecasts. 
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3. Hypotheses 
To develop and test hypotheses based on the results of the last section, the 
high earnings signal is interpreted as a positive revision of a previously issued 
forecast and the low signal is interpreted as a negative revision of a previous 
forecast.8 Consistent with the empirical evidence cited earlier, Proposition 1 
predicts a positive association between the signs of security price changes and 
subsequent analyst revisions. 
Forecast errors are defined as estimated earnings per share minus actual 
earnings per share. If analysts’ forecasts fully incorporate the information in 
price changes, then the sign of the forecast error resulting from a revision 
could not be predicted by prior price changes. On the other hand, Proposi- 
tion 2 indicates that if the information in price changes is excluded from 
revisions, then underestimates (overestimates) become relatively more likely 
to follow positive (negative) price changes. 9 That is, a negative association 
between the sign of the price change and the sign of the forecast error is 
predicted. 
3.1. Data selection 
The empirical tests of this section employ a sample obtained from The 
Value Line Investment Survey for firm fiscal years 1981-1984. The main 
advantage of this database is that it includes a single forecast for each firm 
whose effective date falls within a short interval prior to publication.” 
Consensus data, such as I/B/E/S summary estimates include forecasts that 
may have been formulated as many as two months prior to the I/B/E/S 
publication date. Reliance on Value Line forecasts and publication dates 
increases the likelihood that price changes that were actually observable to 
analysts prior to a forecast revision are properly delineated. The vast majority 
of Value Line forecasts pertain to primary earnings per share before extraor- 
dinary items and discontinued operations. Exceptions are explicitly stated in 
notes to the forecast. Four years of quarterly earnings forecasts were col- 
lected for one hundred firms randomly selected from a set of firms that met 
sclearly a given analyst’s previous forecast of earnings may on occasion be greater (less) than 
the level implied by current price that aggregates all participants’ information. In these cases a 
high flow) signal may already be reflected in an analyst’s outstanding forecast and no revision 
will be observed. If high and low signals are given equal emphasis in analysts’ forecasts when 
they are acquired, then these cases will weaken the predicted associations to be tested but 
should not bias the empirical tests. 
‘In the empirical tests that follow an overestimate (underestimate) occurs when the last 
outstanding forecast prior to earnings announcement overshoots (undershoots) the actual 
earnings number. 
“The identification of the effective date of a forecast is discussed further in section 3.4. 
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Tabfe 1 
Sample description. 
Panel A: 1984 sample market value of common equity (d millions) 
Firms common 
to Value Line Firms on 
Sample firms and Compustat Compustat 
Mean $1,555 $1,371 $884 
Median S379 S378 $116 
N 100 1022 2318 
Panel B: Number of earnings forecasts and revisions by year 
1981 1982 1983 1984 
All 
years 
Number of firms 100 100 100 100 100 
Usable forecasts 336 377 306 351 1370 
Lost to stock splits 64 23 94 49 230 
Total forecasts 400 400 400 400 1600 
Panel C: Revisions by sign and as a percentage of prior forecast 
All 
Size of revision Sign of revision 1981 1982 1983 1984 years 
Absolute size of 
revision greater 
than 10% 
Absolute size of 
revision between 
5% and 10% 
All revisions 
No change 
Positive 58 30 50 40 178 
Negative 102 167 109 102 480 
Positive 22 15 20 27 84 
Negative 33 32 23 42 130 
Positive 
(% of revised) 
Negative 






















all of the following criteria: 
1. Inclusion in the (1987) NYSE-AMEX CRSP Daily Returns file for the 
period between 1980 and 1985. 
2. Earnings data available on the Quarrerfy Compucifut Indurrtiuf tape for the 
period between 1980 and 1985. 
3. Quarterly forecasts included in The Value Line Investment Surcey for the 
period between 1980 and 1985. 
Panel A of table 1 presents mean and median market value of equity for 
three separate groups of firms. The first column of panel A describes firms in 
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the selected sample. The second and third columns present similar descrip- 
tive statistics for all firms common to Value Line and Compustat during 1984 
and all firms listed on the Quarterly Compustat Industrial tape during 1984, 
respectively. A comparison reveals that the sample selected from the firms 
listed on both Compustat and Value Line are biased toward the larger 
companies. 
Panel B of table 1 presents information about the number of quarterly 
earnings forecasts for the sample firms in the fiscal years ending in 1981 
through 1984. When stock splits occur, it is often difficult to ensure that 
analysts’ EPS forecasts are based on the same number of shares used in the 
calculation of announced EPS. Therefore, forecasts pertaining to firm years 
in which splits occurred are excluded from the sample. To avoid potential 
problems introduced by serial correlation in forecast revisions only the last 
earnings forecast before an actual quarterly earnings announcement is used 
in the empirical tests.” 
3.2. Recision tendencies and frequency 
One interesting aspect of the data presented is found in panel C of table 1. 
The number of downward revisions is substantially greater than the number 
of upward revisions in every year. This is true regardless of the relative 
magnitude of the revision. This finding is consistent with Jain (1988) who 
found that negative revisions represent almost three quarters of all revisions 
in the I/B/E/S database for the years 1976 to 1986.‘* Stickel (forthcoming) 
finds that the intercept term of a prediction model of revisions is significantly 
negative for Zacks data over the period 1980-1985, indicating an average 
downward revision. The revision characteristics of Value Line data appear to 
resemble other analyst forecast sources for the sample period. 
3.3. Forecast errors: Bias and accuracy 
Data describing the characteristics of forecast errors are presented in 
panel A of table 2. Forecast errors are calculated as follows: 
(Forecasted EPS,, -Actual EPS,) , 
“This correlation may be the result of a trend in an economic variable that impacts on firm 
earnings. Several revisions may occur before the full magnitude of the trend is fully apparent to 
forecasters and included in their forecasts. 
“BFN find no significant difference in the sign of individual and consensus revisions for the 
500 firms represented in their I/B/E/S sample from 1976-1980. If their sample was represen- 
tative of the 1976-1980 period, then it may be inferred that the tendency for negative revisions 
found by Jain and Stickel is attributable to the post-1980 years. These years subsume the sample 
period in this study. 
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Table 2 
Description of forecast errors. 
Panel A: Summary statistics for mean error f,Cf,!Z), mean absolute error (MAE), 
and mean squared error (MSE): N = 1370 
ME MAE MSE 
Mean 0.04 0.18 0.15 
Median 0.01 0.10 0.01 
Std. dev. 0.38 0.34 1.15 
IQR= 0.18 0.15 0.03 
Panel B: Distribution of forecast errors by fiscal yearb 
Overestimates Underestimates 
N Mean Median Std. dev. N Mean Median Std. dev. 
1981 177 0.21 0.10 0.35 152 - 0.23 -0.12 0.44 
1982 212 0.24 0.12 0.41 152 -0.13 - 0.09 0.18 
1983 160 0.17 0.11 0.24 13-t - 0.20 -0.10 0.49 
1984 178 0.20 0.08 0.32 152 -0.11 - 0.07 0.13 
Total 727 0.21 0.10 0.34 590 -0.17 - 0.09 0.34 
alnterquartile range. 
bExcluding observations for which reported EPS equals forecasted EPS. 
where the subscript i denotes firm and t the forecast date. Deflating forecast 
errors by stock price just prior to the date of the forecast to control for 
cross-sectional differences in earnings levels does not qualitatively alter the 
descriptive measure patterns seen in table 2 or the statistical tests described 
later in footnotes 22 and 24. Deflating by stock price is not relevant for the 
test presented in section 4. 
The mean forecast error is positive (overestimate) in every year, consistent 
with prior research, e.g., Fried and Givoly (1982), BFN (19851, and O’Brien 
(1988).‘3 Panel A of table 2 includes a summary of two common measures of 
forecast accuracy: the mean absolute error and the mean square error 
(ME). Abarbanell (1989) reports a consistent decline in the magnitude of 
both measures in each quarter’s outstanding forecast as the EPS announce- 
ment date is approached. Overall, the Value Line forecast accuracy charac- 
teristics are consistent with those reported in the literature for other databases 
such as I/B/E/S [e.g., BFN (1985)], Zucks [e.g., Stickel (198811, and The 
Earnings Forecaster [e.g., Fried and Givoly (198211. 
Panel B of table 2 presents evidence on the incidence of forecast overesti- 
mates and underestimates for quarterly earnings forecasts by fiscal year. 
Fifty-three observations for which reported earnings equalled forecasted 
13Q’Brien reports that the median forecast error for I/B/E/S detail data over the period 
1975-1981 was an overestimate but not generally significantly different from zero. 
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earnings are excluded. Forecast error data are based on firm earnings 
announcements as reported by Value Line. Forecast errors based on earnings 
as reported by Compustat were also examined.14 Choice of actual earnings 
source did not significantly affect the distribution of forecast errors described 
in this section. Results are reported for Value Line actual earnings an- 
nouncements only. 
The rate of overestimation exceeds the rate of underestimation in each of 
the four fiscal years which is consistent with Fried and Givoly (1982). BFN 
(1985), however, find for their sample of I/B/E/S cdnSenSm forecasts that 
underestimates were more likely to occur than overestimates.‘5 The excess of 
overestimates over underestimates was a consideration contributing to the 
choice of tests discussed in the next section. 
3.4. Returns 
Two variables representing price changes are calculated. The first is a raw 
returns variable, denoted RET, which is the average daily return for a firm 
between earnings forecasts. The period is referred to as the cumulation 
interval. The second price change variable is based on abnormal returns and 
is calculated by cumulating daily abnormal returns during the cumulation 
interval and dividing by the number of days between forecasts.16 This 
variable is denoted CAR. 
The raw return variable is included because abnormal returns are, by 
construction, orthogonal to market returns. A potential problem arises in a 
14The two services agree on over 75% of the usable reported earnings. Of the announcements 
for which there is a discrepancy, a large majority differ by trivial amounts. Adjustments were 
made, where possible, to reconcile the two numbers of primary EPS. Philbrick and Ricks (1989) 
report that pairing Value Line EPS forecasts with Value Line earnings and announcements 
leads to less absolute forecast error than pairing Value Line forecasts with Compustat actual 
earnings. They also report stronger associations in tests that associate excess returns and Value 
Line actual earnings announcements as compared with tests using Compustat announcements. 
“It is possible that analysts tend to be optimistic in their estimates because they wish to 
maintain good relations with management. Abarbanell (1989) reports that the average overesti- 
mate declines steadily over the six months prior to an announcement. The average underesti- 
mate over time remains relatively stable, however. Analysts gradually purging forecasts of 
elements that are inflated relative to new information is consistent with these two patterns. An 
alternative explanation for the observed tendency to overestimate is offered by O’Brien (1988). 
She argues that it results from unanticipated macroeconomic (bad news) events that are 
recognized only subsequent to analysts’ forecasts for a particular period. If this explanation is 
correct there would be no a priori reason to expect one type of forecast error to be more likely 
than another. The relative impact of these competing hypotheses is currently an unresolved 
issue. 
16For each revision observation a cumulative abnormal return is calculated using the following 
market model specification: x,(Ri, - ai - t3,(R,,,,)) where Ri, is the return for firm i on day t. 
R,, is the equally weighted market return on day t. The parameters ai and & were estimated 
using daily returns between week +26 and +52 relative to the last earnings forecast [see 
Copeland and Mayen (1982)]. 
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forecasting context because market returns reflect information about how 
market-wide events will affect firm earnings. These market-wide events are 
likely to be factored into analysts’ forecasts. ” Results in the next section are 
reported for both raw and abnormal returns. 
A final issue related to calculating returns is the delay between the date 
Value Line analysts formulate an earnings estimate (which is unobservable) 
and the date this estimate is published. The publication date on Value Line 
is defined as the ‘public forecast date’. Forecasts to be printed on a particular 
Friday are typically collected from analysts by the Monday of that week. 
Subsequently analysts may, on occasion, submit a supplemental report with a 
revision up to the date of publication if a significant event transpires. To 
ensure that only security returns potentially observable to the analyst prior to 
a forecast are included in the price change variable, returns for a given firm 
are cumulated up to ten days prior to the public forecast date. That is, the 
cumulation interval runs from the previous public forecast date to ten days 
prior to the public forecast date. The ten-day cutoff is likely to exclude 
returns occurring after Value Line submits its forecast to the printer but 
before the public forecast date.” 
Two additional specifications for cumulating returns were also considered. 
The first employs a cumulation interval that runs from ten days prior to the 
previous public forecast date to ten days prior to the public forecast date. 
The second cumulates returns between consecutive public forecast dates. 
The overall results of the empirical tests reported in the next section are not 
sensitive to these specifications Results for individual years are generally 
unchanged under alternative cumulation intervals. Individual year differences 
are noted where appropriate. 
4. Empirical results 
4.1. Tests of association between prior returns and revisions 
The first test of this section is intended to establish that the positive 
association between analysts’ forecast revisions and prior security returns 
which is predicted by Proposition 1 and observed in other databases is found 
in the Value Line sample. 
Proposition 1 predicts that 
prob[y,IP’>PO] >prob[y,IP’<PO] 
“The difficulties engendered by first calculating abnormal returns and then associating them 
with other variables is discussed in Beaver (1987). Abarbanell (1989) suggests additional 
statistical reasons for favoring the use of raw returns rather than abnormal returns in these tests 
and presents evidence that indicates there is a significant component to analyst forecasts 
revisions which represents the effect of market movements on individual firms. 
‘8Cumulating returns up to five days prior to the last forecast did not cause substantiative 
differences in the results described below. 
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and 
prob[ y#* <PO] > prob[ y,lP’ > ~“1. 
The test of this proposition employs the following statistic: 
freq[ Ret > OlRetum > 0] - freq[ Rer > OlRetum < 0] > 0, (3) 
where Rer,! > 0 ( < 0) denotes an upward (downward) revision and Return is 
measured by the RET and CAR variables described in the last section.” 
If, ex ante, positive and negative price changes occur with equal frequency 
and positive and negative revisions also occur with equal frequency, then 
under a null hypothesis of independence between the sign of revisions and 
prior price changes this test statistic is equivalent to a phi coefficient 
calculated for a 2 x 2 contingency table categorized by the signs of returns 
and revisions2’ A normal approximation can be used to assess significance in 
this case [see Conover (197111. While the frequencies of positive and negative 
return observations are expected to be close to equal when abnormal returns 
measure price changes, the same is not true when raw returns are used. 
Further, the empirical evidence found in the literature is inconclusive with 
regard to the ex ante probability of observing positive and negative revisions. 
The prolonged excess of negative revisions over positive revisions observed in 
the sample, however, suggests the possibility of a systematic difference in 
their likelihoods. Because the distribution of the test statistic in (3) is 
unknown in this circumstance, an approximate randomization test is used to 
assess significance.2’ Under the null hypothesis that earnings revisions are 
unrelated to price changes, the test proceeds by shuffling the revisions 
relative to price changes. The significance level of the test is based on the 
number of times the value of the test statistic in the shuffled data exceeds the 
value in the original sample. [See Noreen (1989) for details.] 
Table 3 presents results along with contingency tables categorized by the 
sign of the revision and the sign of prior raw returns UZET) and prior 
abnormal returns (CAR). The hypotheses tested in this section are condi- 
tional on the analyst revising a previously outstanding forecast, therefore, 
zero revision observations are excluded. Results for individual fiscal years 
and all years aggregated are reported. 
Based on the randomization test the null hypothesis of independence 
between the signs of revisions and RET is rejected in favor of the alternative 
“Because the earnings state is limited to two outcomes a test of Prob[~,,IPt > PO] > 
prob[ y,, ]P’ <PO] is, simultaneously, a test of prob[ y,]P’ <PO] > prob( y,]P > P 1. 
mThe phi coefficient, I$, is equal to ffNPPN,. - N,,,N,,)/fN,. N.PN,,. N.,Jt/*, where N. 
and N., denote column totals and N,,. and N,,. denote row totals for the 2 x 2 tables in table c 
I$ differs from the statistic in (3) by a factor of (N.,N.,/N,,. N,,.)‘/*. 
*‘The values of the proposed test statistic and phi coefficients for each year and in aggregate 
are very similar. The p-values obtained through the randomization tests are very close to those 





Statistic 0.259 0.193 0.129 
p valueb 0.001 0.001 0.031 
prob( p < O.Ol)= 1.00 1.00 o.ocil 
prob( p < 0.05) 1.00 1.00 0.999 
prob(p < 0.10) 1.00 1.00 1.00 
+ - + - 
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Table 3 
Approximate randomization tests. 
Statistic: freq[ Rev > 0 I Returns > 01 - freq[ Rev > 0 I Returns < 0] 
All 
1981 1982 1983 1984 years 
The association between the sign of revisions and the sign of prior cumulative returns” 
Rev 
‘-k~-%‘~‘~~~ 
Statistic 0.204 0.178 0.037 0.203 0.153 
p value 0.001 0.001 0.34 0.001 0.001 
proMp < 0.01) 1.00 1.00 0.000 1.00 1.00 
prob(p < 0.05) 1.00 1.00 0.000 1.00 1.00 
prob(p < 0.10) 1.00 1.00 0.000 1.00 1.00 
‘Returns are cumulated between the previous public forecast date up to ten days before the 
public forecast date. 
bTests are based on one thousand shuffles of revisions relative to returns. 
‘Represents the posterior probability that the approximated significance level of the test is less 
than or equal to a given rejection level for the test. The significance level is a function of the 
number of shuffles and the number of times the test statistic for the shuffled data equals or 
exceeds the value computed for the original data. A uniform [O, 11 prior distribution is assumed 
for p. 
of a positive association. The association between the signs of forecast 
revisions and CAR is generally weaker in comparison to RET.22 Results for 
=As a way of including zero revision observations return portfolios using a positive (F,), zero 
(F,), .or negative (F,) revision classification were formed. An n-sample version of the 
Mann-Whitney test based on ranks [see discussion of the Jonckheere-Terpstra test in Hollander 
and Wolf (197311 was performed on the null hypothesis F,, r F, r F, against the ordered 
alternative F,, <F, < FP. The null was rejected in each year and all years combined at signifi- 
cance levels below 0.001 for both raw and abnormal returns. 
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the CAR variable in 1983 indicate an insignificant association. The lower 
significance levels for 1983 may be due, in part, to the relatively large number 
of observations lost to stock splits in that year. The results for the combined 
years are not sensitive to the choice of cumulation interval. Individual year 
results are, in general, unchanged as we11.23 
The evidence indicates a statistically significant positive association be- 
tween the sign of cumulative returns between forecasts and the sign of 
subsequent revisions for Value Line data. While there are no equivalent tests 
in the empirical literature based solely on the signs of these variables, the 
results are consistent with parametric tests reported for other analyst forecast 
sources covering different sample periods.24 
4.2. Tests of association between prior returns and forecast errors 
The tests of this section attempt to distinguish whether analysts’ forecasts 
fully incorporate information in prior price changes. Proposition 2 indicates 
that if prior price changes are not reflected in analysts’ forecasts, then the 
probability that a low earnings forecast is inaccurate (negative forecast error) 
increases when preceded by a positive price change and decreases when 
preceded by a negative price change. Similarly, the probability that a high 
earnings forecast is inaccurate (a positive forecast error) increases when 
preceded by a negative price change and decreases when preceded by a 
positive price change. 
The following statistic is calculated to test the proposition: 
freq[ Error < OlRetums > 0] - freq[ Error < 01 Returns < 0] > 0.25 
(4) 
UDefine a change from above (below) to below (above) a 0.05 significance level for rejecting 
the null as a qualitative difference in the results. Then the only qualitative changes were as 
follows: A cumulation interval for abnormal returns between consecutive public forecast dates 
yields a significance level of 0.049 for 1983 as compared to the value of 0.34 reported in table 3. 
A cumulation interval for raw returns that runs from ten days before the previous public forecast 
date to ten days before the public forecast date leads to an insignificant association in 1983 (the 
significance level changes from 0.031 reported in table 3 to 0.24) and a weaker association for 
1984 (the significance level changes from 0.002 reported in table 3 to 0.08). 
*%tests for significant differences between the mean returns of portfolios based on the sign of 
revisions and the overall mean return result in similar conclusions to those reported for the 
nonparametric tests above. These tests are based on the aggregate sample standard deviation. 
One-way layouts based on a pooled standard deviation weighted by the number of observations 
in each revision portfolio also indicate a descending order of the magnitude of mean returns to 
the positive, zero, and negative revision portfolios, respectively. Scheffe multiple comparisons of 
all pairs of individual portfolio means lead to rejection of identical means at standard confidence 
levels. 
‘?n a two earnings state world this is simultaneously a test of: freq[ Error > OlReturns < 01 - 
freq[ Error > 0 (Returns > 01 > 0. 
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Table 4 
Approximate randomization tests. 
Forecast error f (Revised earnings forecast - Actual earnings) 
Statistic: freq[ Error > 0 I Reruns < 01 - freq[ Error > 0 I Retums > 01 
1981 1982 1983 1984 
All 
years 
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+ - 
Error 
+ 82 95 + 
I - 79 73 - 
Statistic 0.056 0.014 
p value 0.201 0.452 
prob( p < 0.01) 0.000 0.000 
probf p < 0.05) 0.000 0.000 
probfp < 0.10) 0.000 0.000 
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aReturns are cumulated between the previous public forecast date up to ten days before the 
public forecast date. 
bTests are based on one thousand shuffles of revisions relative to returns. 
‘Represents the posterior probability that the approximated significance level of the test is less 
than or equal to a given rejection level for the test. The significance level is a function of the 
number of shuffles and the number of times the test statistic for the shuffled data equals or 
exceeds the value computed for the original data. A uniform [0, 11 prior distribution is assumed 
for p. 
Table 4 presents results and contingency tables categorized by the sign of the 
forecast error and the sign of prior raw returns (RET) and prior abnormal 
returns (CAR). Results for individual fiscal years and all years aggregated are 
reported. If the ex ante probabilities of negative and positive price changes 
are equal and the same is true for the probabilities of positive and negative 
forecast errors, then, under a null hypothesis of independence between the 
sign of forecast errors and prior returns, the proposed statistic in (4) is 
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equivalent to the phi coefficient related to each contingency table. While the 
C’ variable approximates this assumption about price changes the RET 
variable does not. Moreover, the evidence presented in section 3 indicates 
the possibility of a systematic upward bias in analysts’ forecasts. For these 
reasons an approximate randomization test is used to assess the significance 
of the test statistic.26 
The results reported in table 4 based on raw returns indicate that the null 
hypothesis of independence can be rejected below the 0.001 level for all years 
combined.*’ Independence can be rejected at standard significance levels in 
every year except 1983 (0.101). The results based on abnormal returns, CAR, 
as a measure of price changes are similar for all years combined though 
relatively weaker. Independence between forecast errors and prior abnormal 
returns cannot be rejected for 1981 and 1982 at traditional significance levels. 
The results for all years combined are not sensitive to the choice of cumula- 
tion interval. Individual year results are, in general, unchanged under alter- 
native cumulation periods.** 
The evidence presented in this section fails to support the hypothesis that 
analysts’ forecasts fully reflect the information in price movements occurring 
prior to their forecasts. In addition, the evidence is inconsistent with analysts 
‘simply re-expressing’ price changes in their revisions.29 
5. Summary and conclusions 
The analysis in this paper suggests a positive association between earnings 
forecasts and prior price changes whether or not price changes are combined 
with analysts’ private signals to formulate their forecasts. Further, if informa- 
26As before the value of the proposed test statistic is similar to the phi coefficient calculated 
for each contingency table. 
“Zero forecast error observations represent a small fraction of the total number. The 
differences in the values of the statistics calculated are not noteworthy. Therefore, the practice 
of excluding the zero forecast error observations from the contingency tables is adopted in these 
tests. 
*sDefine a change from above (below) to below (above) a 0.05 significance level for rejecting 
the null as a qualitative difference in the results. Then the only qualitative changes were as 
follows: Cumulating abnormal returns between consecutive public forecast dates leads to 
rejection of the null hyoothesis at a lower significance level than that reuorted in table 4 for 1983 
(01021 compared to 651) and a higher level for 1984 (0.101 compared to 0.027). Similarly, 
cumulating abnormal returns from ten days before the previous public forecast date to ten days 
before the public forecast date results in rejecting the null hypothesis at a lower significance 
level than that reported in table 4 for 1983 (0.017 compared to 0.051) and a higher level for 1984 
(0.09 compared to 0.027). 
“Equivalently, the evidence is inconsistent with the hypothesis that price changes actually 
mirror the private information that analysts have acquired and a delay in their public dissemina- 
tion makes it appear as if forecasts trail price changes. 
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tion in price changes is omitted from analysts’ forecasts these price changes 
will predict the sign of the forecast errors. 
The empirical evidence fails to support the hypothesis that analysts’ 
forecasts fully incorporate prior price changes. The results are consistent 
with analysts omitting price change information from their earnings forecasts. 
One explanation for the result is that analysts are inefficient in collecting 
and interpreting publicly observable signals. One problem with this explana- 
tion is that it requires that analysts fail to recognize their tendency to 
underweight information over the reasonably long period covered by the 
sample. 
A second explanation for the results is that the private information is more 
easily inferred by investors if it is not combined with other signals whose 
information content is open to individual interpretation.30 This explanation is 
consistent with the casual observation that analysts often leave forecasts 
outstanding for long periods even after fairly large price changes are ob- 
served. This behavior may be indicative of analysts having incentives to 
provide a new forecast only when they have obtained new private information 
independently of price changes. 
An important implication of this study concerns how analysts’ forecasts, 
which have generally been conceded to be more accurate than time series 
models, should be incorporated as a measure of market expectations. The 
results suggest that two identical forecasts can be interpreted differently by 
market participants depending on price changes prior to the forecasts. It can 
be inferred, for example, that the distribution of forecasts (and, therefore, 
forecast errors) is potentially skewed in one direction when price changes of 
a particular sign prior to forecasts are prevalent. Moreover, if investors are 
aware of this fact they are likely to take it into account when forming their 
posteriors. 
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